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a b s t r a c t 
The Internet has provided people with new ways of expressing not only their individuality but also their 
collectivity i.e., their group aﬃliations. These group identities are the shared sense of belonging to a 
group. Online contact with others who share the same group identity can lead to cooperation and, even, 
coordination of social action initiatives both online and oﬄine. Such social actions may be for the pur- 
poses of positive change, e.g., the Arab Spring in 2010, or disruptive, e.g., the England Riots in 2011. 
Stylometry and authorship attribution research has shown that it is possible to distinguish individuals 
based on their online language. In contrast, this work proposes and evaluates a model to analyse group 
identities online based on textual conversations amongst groups. We argue that textual features make it 
possible to automatically distinguish between different group identities and detect whether group iden- 
tities are salient (i.e., most prominent) in the context of a particular conversation. We show that the 
salience of group identities can be detected with 95% accuracy and group identities can be distinguished 
from others with 84% accuracy. We also identify the most relevant features that may enable mal-actors 
to manipulate the actions of online groups. This has major implications for tools and techniques to drive 
positive social actions online or safeguard society from disruptive initiatives. At the same time, it poses 
privacy challenges given the potential ability to persuade or dissuade large groups online to move from 
rhetoric to action. 
© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 
1. Introduction 
Global and national events over recent years have shown that 
online social media can be a force for good (e.g., Arab Spring in 
2010) and harm (e.g., the England Riots in 2011). In both of these 
examples, social media played a key role in group formation and 
organisation, and in the coordination of the group’s subsequent 
collective actions (i.e., the move from rhetoric to action) ( Halliday, 
2011; Tufekci & Wilson, 2012 ). Such coordinated actions are possi- 
ble because individuals identify themselves with a particular social 
group or with an ideal ( Taylor, Whittier, & Morris, 1992 ). Online 
identity in such contexts is, therefore, not so much about the cat- 
egorisation of the self as a singular “I”. Instead it is the conception 
and expression of group aﬃliations as a more inclusive “we”. 
This paper focuses on these online group identities. Oﬄine 
group identities are usually referred to as social identities by social 
identity theory ( Deaux, 1996; Stryker & Burke, 20 0 0; Tajfel, 2010 ), 
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a social psychological theory that sets out to explain group pro- 
cesses, intergroup relationships and the social self. Social identity 
is the individual’s explicit or implicit expression of belonging to 
certain social group, together with some emotional and value sig- 
niﬁcance to him/her of the group membership ( Tajfel, 2010 ). Thus, 
a person has not one “personal self” but rather multiple social 
identities that are culturally contingent and contextual ( Hankin, 
2013 ). The salient identity is the identity that comes into play 
and is invoked in a speciﬁc situation or context ( Stryker & Burke, 
20 0 0 ). Thus, a social identity is salient when it is invoked across 
a group of persons who perceive themselves as members of a so- 
cial group. Which identity becomes salient in a given situation de- 
pends on factors such as the level of commitment of a person to 
a particular identity. One component of commitment is the num- 
ber of others with whom one is connected by possessing a partic- 
ular identity. Thus, when a person shares a certain identity with 
a greater number of people, his/her commitment to that identity 
tends to be higher and this identity is likely to be more salient 
( Stryker, 1980 ). 
Given the importance of online social media in orchestrating 
and coordinating large-scale group mobilisations —from democracy 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2016.06.023 
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and protest movements to hacktivist groups through to riots and 
extreme right wing marches— group identities are of key interest 
to a variety of stakeholders. They can be: mobilised as a resource 
for positive social change; studied to understand and counteract 
organised online actions that may compromise the safety and se- 
curity of citizens; and even potentially be harnessed to build re- 
silience in individuals and groups to limit the harmful effects of 
government or extremist efforts to disrupt online group formation 
and subsequent mobilisation. 
Of course, group identities are not the only variable that pre- 
dicts behaviour, but they can provide a guide to likely behaviours 
—as stated by social identity theory the higher the salience of 
a social identity (i.e., the identiﬁcation with a particular group), 
the greater the individual’s willingness to contribute to the social 
action ( Bagozzi & Dholakia, 2002; Stryker & Burke, 20 0 0 ). Social 
identities have been shown to inﬂuence behaviour in many do- 
mains, including politics ( Jackson & Smith, 1999 ), protest move- 
ments ( Reicher, 1996 ) and fan behaviour ( Platow et al., 1999 ). 
Knowing how salient is group identity can lead to predictions of 
how much the identity will inﬂuence the individuals’ beliefs, emo- 
tions and actions. Since the activation of a social identity affects 
the way people think as well as their feelings and behaviours, 
our hypothesis is that such group identities also affect the way 
in which people communicate online. As such, our model char- 
acterises text-based online communications in terms of a set of 
textual features such as their language, their style and their in- 
teraction patterns (i.e., the way in which users interact). We then 
study the features that can best distinguish between different 
group identities online as well as those features that can indicate 
the salience, or lack thereof, group identities. We address research 
questions categorised as follows: 
1. Detecting salience of group identities: 
(a) Do group identities manifest in online conversations, i.e., is 
it possible to use textual features to automatically detect the 
presence of salient group identities? 
(b) Is our analysis model generalizable to detect identity 
salience across different group identities and on different 
online social media? 
(c) Which features are most suitable for detecting identity 
salience? 
2. Distinguishing group identities: 
(a) Is it possible to distinguish between different group identi- 
ties on the basis of textual features automatically extracted 
from conversations? 
(b) Is our analysis model generalizable to distinguish group 
identities over time and on different online social media? 
(c) Which features enable a speciﬁc group identity to be accu- 
rately predicted? 
Our evaluation shows that, by using a range of structural, gram- 
matical, semantic, categorical and stylistic features, our model can 
detect the salience of group identities with 95% accuracy and dis- 
tinguish between group identities with 84% accuracy. In general, 
our study reveals that there is much more valuable information 
available on social media than just personal data. We identify fea- 
tures of online conversations that can reveal important dynamics 
of online groups and, hence, potential drivers for mobilisation of 
such groups. Notwithstanding the importance of protecting per- 
sonal data on online social media ( Anthonysamy, Greenwood, & 
Rashid, 2013; Madejski, Johnson, & Bellovin, 2011 ), it is also im- 
portant to study and understand how group identities are formed 
and could be exploited for positive or negative ends. While the for- 
mer has the potential to adversely affect individuals, the latter has 
major implications for social action/inaction in our modern digital 
society. 
The novel contributions of this paper are fourfold: 
1. This is the ﬁrst paper to propose a model to analyse online 
group identities based on social identity principles. 
2. We use textual features to detect group identity and its 
salience. In contrast with other works that study the diﬃculties 
people encounter when interacting with heterogeneous groups 
in an online social network, e.g., ( DiMicco & Millen, 2007 ), or 
how online identities are constructed and shaped, e.g. ( Zhao, 
Grasmuck, & Martin, 2008 ), all the features analysed in our 
model are extracted fully automatically, i.e., no human inter- 
vention is required. 
3. We demonstrate that group identities and their salience man- 
ifest themselves, with a high degree of accuracy, in text-based 
online communications through a range of structural, grammat- 
ical, semantic, categorical and stylistic features. 
4. Our results open up key privacy challenges for the research 
community at large with regards to the potential exploitation of 
group identities to persuade or dissuade large groups online to 
move from rhetoric to action. We have implemented an online 
tool that enables study of features underpinning online group 
identities in order to investigate these challenges. We identify 
which features can put online groups at most risk of such ma- 
nipulation by mal-actors so as to build resilience against such 
out-group inﬂuences. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 de- 
scribes related work. Section 3 presents our model for analysing 
group identities including the features and the classiﬁers used 
in the analysis. Section 4 describes experiments that validate of 
our model including the datasets used and the results obtained. 
We discuss the implications of our model and experiments in 
Section 5 . Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and identiﬁes di- 
rections for future work. 
2. Related work 
Within the Artiﬁcial Intelligence ﬁeld different computational 
models have been proposed to represent social identities. One of 
the most cited models is the ABIR (Agent-Based Identity Reper- 
toire) model ( Lustick, 20 0 0 ), which seeks to reﬁne, elaborate, 
and test theories of identity and identity shifts. This model has 
been used in agent-based simulations to analyse the emergence 
( Rousseau & Van Der Veen, 2005 ) and dynamics ( Smaldino, Pickett, 
Sherman, & Schank, 2012 ) of social identities oﬄine. To the best of 
our knowledge, ours is the ﬁrst model for the automatic analysis 
of group identities invoked on different online social media. 
There are empirical proposals, as ours, that draw conclusions 
about identity from information extracted from online social me- 
dia. DiMicco and Millen ( DiMicco & Millen, 2007 ) describe a study 
about the way in which people present themselves (i.e., the way in 
which people invoke their identities) on Facebook. Speciﬁcally, the 
authors analysed Facebook proﬁles and interviewed employees be- 
longing to the same company with the aim of understanding how 
they managed their identity when interacting with different social 
groups (e.g., family, friends from school, workmates, etc.) on Face- 
book. The main contribution of their study was the identiﬁcation 
of the diﬃculties that people encounter when interacting with het- 
erogeneous groups using the same online social network; and the 
identiﬁcation of the need for more sophisticated controls that help 
one to manage one’s identities online. Similarly, Zhao et al. ( Zhao 
et al., 2008 ) analysed Facebook proﬁles of students in a university 
to study how these students presented themselves on Facebook. 
They focused on how the online identities of these persons were 
“built” on Facebook. An interesting conclusion of their study is that 
identities are usually claimed implicitly on Facebook (e.g., people 
express that they belong to a group of friends by posting pictures 
with these friends instead of writing it in their self-description). 
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Our model, on the other hand, explores group identities by fo- 
cusing on automatically analysing the interactions among users in 
which these identities are implicitly salient. 
In recent study, Conover et al. ( Conover et al., 2011 ) utilised 
clustering and manual annotation of tweets to analyse the way 
in which people with different political orientations (i.e., political 
identities) communicate on Twitter. Speciﬁcally, they analysed the 
retweets and mentions (which include replies) among users with 
different political orientations. Their study shows that tweets are 
usually retweeted by users who have a homogeneous political ori- 
entation. In contrast, tweets are mentioned by users with a hetero- 
geneous political orientation. 
In all the proposals aforementioned, the information is man- 
ually analysed and processed by humans. However, there are 
other proposals, like ours, in which the information is automat- 
ically analysed and processed. Research in the ﬁeld of stylome- 
try and authorship attribution has focused on automatically distin- 
guishing between individuals online ( Narayanan et al., 2012; Sta- 
matatos, 2009 ) as well as deception detection in online conversa- 
tions ( Afroz, Brennan, & Greenstadt, 2012; Rashid et al., 2013 ). In 
contrast, our approach focuses on analysis of group identities in- 
stead of personal characteristics. 
Within the area of Social Networks a signiﬁcant amount of 
work has been done to detect user communities or densely con- 
nected subgroups of users in the network ( Girvan & Newman, 
2002 ). In particular, several tools have been proposed to detect 
communities automatically using unsupervised machine learning 
algorithms ( Culotta, Bekkerman, & McCallum, 2004; Fogués, Such, 
Espinosa, & Garcia-Fornes, 2014; Matsuo et al., 2007 ). Although 
communities and group identities are not exactly the same con- 
cept (e.g., the fact that users belong to the same domain in a net- 
work does not entail that they feel as members of the same social 
group), it might be argued that the same techniques used for com- 
munity detection can be used for group identity analysis. However, 
proposals on community detection assume that the social network 
graph is known (i.e., the users and the relationships between users 
are known), which makes possible the identiﬁcation of tightly knit 
groups of users. However, this assumption is too strong for group 
identity analysis because it is not necessarily true that all users 
sharing a group identity are known. Similarly, user relationships 
are likely to be unknown in this prediction problem. For example, 
in many online social media, like Facebook, the information about 
users’ friends is private and cannot be exploited to detect group 
identities that are expressed explicitly (i.e., by means of friend- 
ship relationships). This paper goes beyond these approaches by 
using textual features to analysis group identities that are implic- 
itly salient in online conversations. 
Recent research on Natural Language Processing is directing its 
efforts towards analysing short text messages exchanged online 
( Han & Baldwin, 2011 ). In particular, several authors have pro- 
posed to combine machine learning and natural language process- 
ing techniques to produce models that annotate short text mes- 
sages with tags identifying speciﬁc themes or content ( Ramage, 
Hall, Nallapati, & Manning, 2009 ). Note that these techniques can 
be used to detect conversations corresponding to speciﬁc topics, 
which could be used to perform group identity analysis. However, 
the fact that a conversation is associated with a cohesive set of 
topics does not necessary imply that the users share a common 
social identity. For example, messages posted by users in a given 
review site (e.g., TripAdvisor 1 ) may be associated with a reduced 
set of topics according to the nature of the site (e.g., food, accom- 
modation, attractions, etc.), but it is not necessarily true that these 
users identify themselves as members of the same social group. 
1 http://www.tripadvisor.com 
Besides that, these models only allow messages to be annotated 
with a predeﬁned set of tags and, as a consequence, they will fail 
to detect unforeseen topics that may be associated with emerg- 
ing group identities. Our research also combines machine learning 
with different analysis techniques such as NLP, stylometry and in- 
teraction analysis to produce a model speciﬁcally aimed at predict- 
ing group identities. 
Verma et al. ( Verma et al., 2011 ) propose and evaluate a clas- 
siﬁer to detect those tweets that contribute to “situational aware- 
ness” in mass emergency. In ( Gupta & Kumaraguru, 2012 ) the au- 
thors have built a linear regression model that takes as input text- 
content based features to predict the credibility of tweets. Simi- 
larly, in ( Ratkiewicz et al., 2011 ) a web service is presented that 
automatically detects astroturﬁng (i.e., campaigns coming from dis- 
interested, grassroots participants that are in reality carried out by 
a single person or organisation) in Twitter. In a more recent work, 
Cheng et al. ( Cheng, Romero, Meeder, & Kleinberg, 2011 ) analyse 
the structural properties of social networks to predict reciprocity 
of communication among Twitter users. Similar to our approach, 
these proposals illustrate the potential information that can be 
gleaned by automatic analysis of online social media interactions. 
In a recent proposal, Charitonidis et al. ( Charitonidis, Rashid, 
& Taylor, 2015 ) analysed online communications to study oﬄine 
group action processes. In particular, this work analysed different 
Twitter conversations for a speciﬁc event to identify weak sig- 
nals that could be used to predict oﬄine group actions. These re- 
sults evidence that there are such early indicators of group ac- 
tions in online communication. Based on these ﬁndings, our paper 
proposes a novel model to predict the salience of group identi- 
ties in online conversations. In particular, our work complements 
and extends this research by allowing the automated detection 
and identiﬁcation of group identities belonging to different do- 
mains and online media; as opposed to the work of Charitonidis 
et al. ( Charitonidis et al., 2015 ) which analyses Twitter conversa- 
tions corresponding to a speciﬁc event and does not propose a 
general predictive model. 
3. Group identity model 
In this section we present a formal description of the model 
used for analysing group identities. The aims of our model are 
twofold. Firstly, we aim to determine if we can automatically detect 
the existence of salient group identities in text-based online com- 
munications. Such automatic detection of identity salience would 
allow the detection of incipient and unforeseen group identities 
that might lead to social action —as mentioned earlier, several 
works on social identity theory have noted the potential causal 
relationship between the salience of a social identity and social 
action ( Bagozzi & Dholakia, 2002; Stryker & Burke, 20 0 0 ). Sec- 
ondly, we aim to determine if we can automatically distinguish be- 
tween different group identities in text-based online communica- 
tions. This would enable automatic classiﬁcation of interactions ac- 
cording to group identities of interest; e.g., group identities that 
may be considered as dangerous or beneﬁcial. 
3.1. Model overview 
In our model each user u corresponds to an individual. We de- 
note by U the set of users that communicate online. We also as- 
sume that there is a distinguished set I of group identities that 
correspond to social groups (e.g., supporter of Manchester United). 
Each user may belong to different social groups (i.e., s/he may have 
different group identities). 
The information exchanged among users is formalised as tuples 
〈 s, R, c 〉 ; where s ∈ U is the sender, R ⊆ U is the set of receivers, 
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and c is the message content. In this paper we only consider text- 
based messages. Thus, the content of a message c consists of an 
ordered set of words { w 1 , . . . , w n } , and a set of terms { d 1 , ..., d k } 
containing metadata. 
In each message, the sender user can invoke one or more 
group identities. We deﬁne a function invoked that maps each mes- 
sage with the group identities that are invoked in it; i.e., given 
a message 〈 s, R, c 〉 , the identities invoked in it are deﬁned as 
in v oked(〈 s, R, c〉 ) ⊆ I . 
Group identities are culturally contingent and contextual and, 
therefore, invoked in speciﬁc contexts or situations ( Hankin, 2013 ). 
In online textual communication, a message sent by one user is 
usually replied by other users and the context or situation in which 
group identities are invoked is formed by related messages. In par- 
ticular, we deﬁne a set of related messages (i.e., a message and its 
replies) as a conversation. More formally, we deﬁne a conversation 
as a set of ordered messages { m 1 , ..., m n } where each message m i 
is deﬁned as a tuple 〈 s i , R i , c i 〉 . In a conversation, the ﬁrst mes- 
sage ( m 1 ) is a conversation initiation message, i.e., the message 
that started the conversation; and the rest of the messages ({ m 2 , 
..., m n }) are replies to this message. 
As aforementioned, one of the key factors that make it more 
likely that a group identity is salient is the connectedness among 
persons who possess this particular group identity. Thus, when a 
person interacts with others by invoking a group identity and the 
others conﬁrm this identity, then the salience of this identity is re- 
inforced ( Stryker & Burke, 20 0 0 ). In fact, we hypothesise that this 
is one of the main reasons for the formation of online communi- 
ties, to create situations in which group identities can be expressed 
and conﬁrmed. The salient group identities in a conversation are 
the group identities that are invoked repeatedly across the mes- 
sages in a conversation. More formally, we deﬁne the group iden- 
tities that are salient in a conversation as: 
salient({ m 1 , . . . , m n } ) = 
{ q } ⋂ 
in v oked(m i ) 
where q ∈ N such that q < n and ⋂ { q } is the relaxed intersection 
of sets, which corresponds to the classical intersection between 
sets except that it is allowed to relax q sets in order to avoid an 
empty intersection. Thus, the salient group identities is the set 
of all group identities that are invoked across all the messages 
( invoked ( m i )), except q messages at most. Note that the relaxed 
intersection makes it possible to make a robust identiﬁcation of 
salient identities in a conversation with respect to some outlier 
messages that invoke identities that are not predominant in the 
conversation. 
When a conversation involves users who share the same group 
identity and are aware of it, it is highly probable that this group 
identity is invoked across most of the messages. 2 In contrast, when 
a conversation involves users who do not share a group identity or 
who are not aware of this fact, then it is highly probable that the 
messages in the conversation invoke disparate identities and, as a 
consequence, the salient group identity is the empty set. Accord- 
ingly, we deﬁne salience as a function that determines if a group 
identity is salient in a conversation as follows: 
salience ({ m 1 , . . . , m n } ) = 
{
T rue if salient({ m 1 , . . . , m n } )  = ∅ 
F alse otherwise 
2 Note that it is also probable that a small proportion of the messages in a con- 
versation are sent by users who belong to an opposite group and want to confront 
the users sharing the salient group identity, which, in turn, reinforces the salience 
of this group identity ( Reicher, 1996 ). 
3.2. Features analysed 
We use linguistic and structural features of conversations to 
predict the values of the salient and salience functions. In partic- 
ular, we analyse ﬁve feature sets that can be extracted from online 
conversations. These feature sets are further classiﬁed into three 
main categories: (i) online interaction patterns, (ii) natural lan- 
guage features, and (iii) stylistic metrics. 
Online interaction patterns . This category includes features that 
can be extracted by analysing structural metrics of an online con- 
versation: 
Structural feature set. This set is formed by 3 numeric fea- 
tures: (i) the number of messages contained in a conver- 
sation; (ii) the participation-level of users, i.e., the ratio of 
users to the number of messages; and (iii) the average inﬂu- 
ence of messages; deﬁned as the average number of likes or 
retweeted count of messages. 
Natural language features . This category includes features that 
can be extracted by applying natural language processing tech- 
niques to the text of the messages contained in the conversations. 
Speciﬁcally, we make use of the techniques proposed by Rayson 
in ( Rayson, 2008 ) to extract natural language features, since these 
techniques have been successfully used to analyse online conver- 
sations extracted from Peer-2-Peer networks ( Hughes et al., 2008 ) 
or Twitter ( Ferrario et al., 2012 ). These features are grouped into 
three feature sets: 
POS feature set. This set is formed by numeric features that 
represent the relative frequency of basic parts-of-speech 
(POS) in the messages contained in conversations. Examples 
of such features include relative frequency of articles, adjec- 
tives, nouns, etc. To carry out the POS tagging, we use the 
CLAWS ( Garside, 1987 ) tagger, which considers a tagset with 
138 POS tags. 
Semantic feature set. This set is formed by numeric features 
that represent the relative frequency of semantic tags in the 
messages contained in conversations. Examples of such se- 
mantic features include the relative frequency of text clas- 
siﬁed as “geographical names” or text pertaining to “groups 
and aﬃliations”, etc. To carry out the semantic tagging, we 
use the USAS ( Wilson & Rayson, 1993 ) system that considers 
a tagset with 452 semantic tags. 
Category feature set. This set is formed by numeric features 
that represent the relative frequency of 36 categories or key 
concepts that may manifest in a conversation. These key cat- 
egories are obtained by applying the keywords methodol- 
ogy (i.e., applying the keyness calculation to word frequency 
lists) to extract key domain concepts (i.e., applying the key- 
ness calculation to semantic tag frequency lists). Examples 
of such features include relative frequency of categories such 
as sports, politics, etc. To identify categories in conversations 
we make use of Rayson’s approach ( Rayson, 2008 ). 
Stylistic metrics . This category includes stylistic features that can 
be extracted by tools and methods from the ﬁeld of authorship at- 
tribution ( Stamatatos, 2009 ). Speciﬁcally, we use the stylistic met- 
rics proposed in ( Rashid et al., 2013 ), which have been used de- 
tecting masquerading behaviour online: 
Style feature set. This set is formed by 22 numeric features. 
Examples include: the average length of messages in terms 
of words and characters, the frequency of emoticons, and the 
vocabulary richness. 
Note that our feature sets only include features that can be 
analysed considering the information that is publicly available on- 
line. Other features such as demographic information about the 
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users interacting in conversations may be private and cannot be 
exploited to predict group identities. 
3.3. Classiﬁers used 
The features above are used to predict group identities in con- 
versations. Speciﬁcally, the analysis is aimed to detect salient group 
identities and to identify group identities. To this aim we have 
built two types of classiﬁers: 
• Detection classiﬁers, which classify conversations into two cat- 
egories: identity salience , and no salience . A conversation ( c ) be- 
longs to the category identity salience when there is a group 
identity that is salient in the conversation (i.e., when salience ( c ) 
is True ); and to the category no salience otherwise. 
• Identiﬁcation classiﬁers, which classify conversations into a ﬁ- 
nite set of categories corresponding to the group identities that 
are salient in the conversations. More formally, given a conver- 
sation ( c ) an identiﬁcation classiﬁer tries to predict the value of 
the salient function for this conversation ( salient ( c )). 
We have implemented each type of classiﬁer using two dif- 
ferent algorithms: a J48 classiﬁer and a Support Vector Machine 
(SVM) classiﬁer, using the implementations in the Weka 3 data- 
mining tool. These two classiﬁers have demonstrated a good per- 
formance on classiﬁcation tasks with textual data ( Afroz et al., 
2012; Burgoon, Blair, Qin, & Nunamaker Jr, 2003 ). To train these 
classiﬁers we annotate each conversation in our dataset with its 
class and the values of the different features analysed. This leads to 
ﬁve training sets, one per feature set —in each training set conver- 
sations are annotated with their class and the values of one feature 
set. 
3.4. Tool 
We have implemented our model in a tool, Identi-scope , that 
makes these classiﬁers and the underlying feature extraction tools 
available as a workﬂow to support studies of group identities and 
the potential that may come from harnessing a deeper under- 
standing of the processes that underpin such identities. The tool 
enables users to study features underpinning identities of groups 
that make their conversations available publicly. At the same time, 
users can point the tool to their private conversations to under- 
stand the various group identities they inhabit online and the fea- 
tures that underpin those identities. The analysis can be conducted 
over different time periods in the same conversation to study 
ﬂuctuations of social identities in response to particular stimuli, 
for instance, when key features underpinning social identities are 
changed. However, we note that, due to ethical reasons, we have 
not introduced such stimuli into any conversations in order to 
study such ﬂuctuations. They can be a useful tool for users or 
groups to study how their activities online may be inﬂuenced by 
actors aiming to persuade or dissuade them from speciﬁc actions. 
4. Evaluation 
4.1. Datasets used in evaluation 
To evaluate our analysis model we collected text-based datasets 
from Facebook and Twitter. According to our model, we refer to 
each post, comment or tweet as a message . Thus, the content of 
the message is formed by textual content and the metadata con- 
tains information about the message inﬂuence (i.e., the number of 
likes in case of posts and comments, and the retweet count in case 
3 www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/ 
of tweets). Finally, the term conversation refers to a collection that 
includes: a text-based message (i.e., a tweet or post) and other re- 
lated text-based messages (i.e., replies or comments). 
4.1.1. Facebook datasets 
All the information collected was publicly available on Facebook 
in two different periods: (i) between 18th February 2013 and 20th 
April 2013; and (ii) between 12th May 2014 and 12th June 2014. 
For simplicity, we will refer to these collection periods as ﬁrst and 
second, respectively. 
Recent work on social psychology ( Levine & Koschate, 2014 ) has 
demonstrated that the Internet provides users with online spaces 
for expressing their social identities. Their study on Mumsnet , 4 a 
website for parents that hosts discussion forums focused on differ- 
ent topics (e.g., mums, feminism), demonstrates that different fo- 
rums represent different social identities (i.e., feminist forums rep- 
resent the feminist social identity) and that the individuals change 
their writing style to adapt towards the group norm when a social 
identity is salient (e.g., when they post on the feminist forums). In 
accordance with these results, we collected information from the 
Facebook pages of protest groups, sports teams and personalities to 
obtain information about conversations in which group identities 
are salient. 5 Speciﬁcally, we collected conversations posted during 
our two collection periods from the Facebook pages of Anonymous, 
Barack Obama, Beyoncé, Lady Gaga and Manchester United. These 
pages are means to achieve or maintain positive a public image 
and to build a social group around a given protest group, sports 
team or personality. Supporters in turn use these pages to express 
their affection and support and to communicate with other fans. 
Most of these messages invoke the group identity of being a sup- 
porter of a particular person, sports team, or protest group. Besides 
that, users who belong to opposition groups can occasionally post 
messages in these pages to confront the salient group identity. As 
highlighted by social identity theory ( Reicher, 1996 ), these oppo- 
sition messages reinforce the salient group identity even further. 6 
Thus, we assume that the impact of outlier messages (i.e., mes- 
sages invoking disparate group identities) in these conversations is 
negligible and that all conversations belong to the identity salient 
class. For example, we have collected posts and comments from 
the Facebook page of Manchester United Football Club. This page is 
used by someone on his behalf of Manchester United to post infor- 
mation about its activities. Besides, this page is used by thousands 
of users (mainly Manchester United supporters) who comment on 
the posts. These users hold a common identity (being a Manch- 
ester United supporter) and view themselves as members of the 
same social group. For example, one of the messages in our dataset 
posted by someone on behalf of Manchester United contains the 
following text “Rafael wins your Man of the Match vote for his fan- 
tastic display at both ends vs. QPR. Well done Rafael!”. Among the 
messages sent in response to this post we can ﬁnd messages like 
“Oh! He deserves it”, “What goal Rafael !!!”, and “Yeah,congrats to 
rafael. And hope best for you”. 
To obtain information about conversations in which group iden- 
tities are unlikely to be salient, we focused on those situations in 
which a person interacts with others on sites where heterogeneous 
information is published neutrally; i.e., in pages that do not try 
to create a social group around a protest movement, personality 
or sports team. In particular, we obtained a dataset where iden- 
tity salience is necessarily diluted by collecting a large number of 
4 http://www.mumsnet.com 
5 Recall that social identities have been shown to relate to behaviour in these 
domains ( Jackson & Smith, 1999; Platow et al., 1999; Reicher, 1996 ). 
6 Social identities become more salient in situations where a social group con- 
ﬂicts with a relevant opposition group (e.g., when the ideas or interests of opposite 
groups clash) ( Reicher, 1996 ). 
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Table 1 
Facebook pages included in our study. 
Page Collection Inﬂuence Importance 
Period 
Anonymous First 1025210 19635 
Second 1746674 24657 
Barack Obama First 35303430 1211796 
Second 41005573 879450 
Beyoncé First 43985350 424706 
BBC World News First 2950463 74426 
Lady Gaga First 55962915 210843 
Second 66155029 2029189 
Manchester United First 32299914 1356171 
Second 50249810 1628006 
MTV First 43297624 521441 
NBC News First 737559 76122 
YouTube First 71981268 464301 
Inﬂuence = Likes Count 
Importance = Talking About Count 
Table 2 
Facebook dataset (First collection period). 
Page C M U W 
Anonymous 6 1650 1410 45086 
Barack Obama 142 94010 67419 4628148 
Beyoncé 10 2946 2510 172923 
BBC World News 612 52841 46044 1589676 
Lady Gaga 4 1640 1304 21724 
Manchester United 246 88434 77600 1547141 
MTV 152 20765 19601 382797 
NBC News 271 55616 44016 1314677 
YouTube 33 1983 1938 24021 
C = conversations, M = messages, U = Users, W = words 
conversations focused on varied topics and formed by messages 
with different tones. In such conversations, the social structures 
supporting the salience of group identities dissolve ( Burke & Stets, 
1999 ), which leads to users invoking disparate identities. For exam- 
ple, we have collected posts from news pages that aim to cover all 
social, political and other events fairly and impartially. Users read- 
ing and commenting on these news pages may have several group 
identities but the fact that they cannot warranty that a particu- 
lar identity is shared by other users on the news pages makes the 
level of commitment to a particular group identity low and sev- 
eral group identities are likely to be invoked. Thus, we use these 
conversations as samples belonging to the no salience class. Specif- 
ically, we collected all the posts and comments made during the 
ﬁrst collection period from the Facebook pages of BBC World News, 
MTV, NBC News and YouTube. 
We collected information from these sources for three rea- 
sons. Firstly, they are highly inﬂuential and important (see 
Table 1 ). We deﬁne inﬂuence as the power to have an effect on 
other users. Accordingly, we deﬁne that a Facebook page is in- 
ﬂuential when many people like it. Thus, we consider the likes 
count as an inﬂuence measure. We deﬁne importance as the 
actual manifestation of effect on other users. Accordingly, we de- 
ﬁne that a Facebook page is important when many people men- 
tion it. Thus, we consider the talking about count as an importance 
measure. Secondly, these sources are frequently updated and com- 
mented on and, as a consequence, they contain a lot of information 
(see Tables 2 and 3 ). Finally, they cover different types of content, 
such as sports, politics, news, and so on. 
4.1.2. Twitter datasets 
Twitter API dataset . This dataset contains tweets publicly avail- 
able on Twitter between 18 February 2013 and 20 April 2013 that 
have been collected using the Twitter public API. 
Table 3 
Facebook dataset (Second collection period). 
Page C M U W 
Anonymous 4 452 410 11633 
Barack Obama 7 3710 2902 143901 
Lady Gaga 5 998 987 18260 
Manchester United 39 8695 8446 190219 
C = conversations, M = messages, U = Users, W = words 
Table 4 
Proﬁles included in our study. 
Proﬁle Inﬂuence Importance 
Anonymous 911130 10334 
Justin Bieber 36299641 548920 
Barack Obama 28587127 189859 
Lady Gaga 35229893 243017 
Manchester United 538129 2265 
MTV 7621274 25589 
Inﬂuence = Followers Count 
Importance = Listed Count 
Table 5 
Twitter API dataset. 
Proﬁle C M U W 
Anonymous 201 824 714 12598 
Barack Obama 219 2379 1529 41945 
Justin Bieber 295 3289 2700 35870 
Lady Gaga 5 64 47 894 
Manchester United 730 1875 1814 30242 
MTV 642 2122 1925 30481 
C = conversations, M = messages, U = Users, W = words 
Similar to our approach to the Facebook dataset, to obtain infor- 
mation about conversations in which a group identity is salient, we 
collected all the conversations from the Twitter proﬁles of Anony- 
mous, Justin Bieber, Barack Obama, Lady Gaga and Manchester 
United. To obtain information about conversations in which group 
identities are unlikely to be salient, we collected tweets and replies 
from the Twitter proﬁle of MTV. 
We collected information from these sources because (see 
Tables 4 and 5 ): they are highly inﬂuential, important, contain lots 
of information and cover different types of content. We deﬁne that 
a Twitter proﬁle is inﬂuential when many people follow it —i.e., 
followers count. Similarly, we deﬁne that a Twitter proﬁle is impor- 
tant when many people list it —i.e., listed count (a list is a curated 
group of users). 
2011 England Riots Dataset . This dataset contains the tweets ex- 
changed during the 2011 England Riots. The riots are also called 
“BlackBerry riots” because people used mobile devices and social 
media to organise them ( Halliday, 2011 ). Thus, this dataset con- 
tains real tweets exchanged during group identity formation pro- 
cesses, group identity invocation and social action coordination. 
Speciﬁcally, the disturbances reﬂected in our dataset began on Sat- 
urday 6 August 2011, after a protest in Tottenham following the 
death of Mark Duggan, a local who was shot dead by police on 
Thursday 4 August 2011. In the following days the riots spread 
across other parts of London and other cities in England including 
Birmingham, Bristol, and Manchester. 
To collect this dataset, we have used Topsy, 7 which is a search 
engine for social posts and socially shared content, primarily on 
Twitter. The results provided by this search engine are not organ- 
ised following a conversation pattern (i.e., an initiating tweet and 
7 http://topsy.com/ 
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Table 6 
Twitter England riots dataset. 
Set C M U W 
TottenhamPreRiots 29 3467 3151 60875 
TottenhamRiots 29 4244 4203 63189 
LondonRiots 29 4706 4699 73175 
C = conversations, M = messages, U = Users, W = words 
its replies). Thus, we approximated the conversations by grouping 
the tweets according to the time when they were exchanged (e.g., 
consecutive tweets belong to the same conversation). Speciﬁcally, 
we have selected a subset of the tweets corresponding to the riots 
in Tottenham and London as follows: 
1. TottenhamPreRiots . This set contains tweets that match the 
query #tottenham OR tottenham and were exchanged on 
4 Aug. 2011. At that point in time, the riots had not started in 
Tottenham and we assume that tweets invoke disparate iden- 
tities and that conversations belong to the no salience class. In 
fact, during this period of time, the number of tweets matching 
this query per hour was lower than 500. Among these tweets 
we can ﬁnd messages like: “has delighted the board of Totten- 
ham Hotspur by winning the Premier Division” and “So we just 
got to tottenham hale & realised we left our money at home. 
Doh! Back we go”. 
2. TottenhamRiots . This set contains tweets that match the query 
#tottenham OR tottenham and were sent on the 6 Aug. 
2011. At that point in time, riots were very prominent in Tot- 
tenham and, as mentioned above, Twitter and other social net- 
works were used to coordinate social action. Indeed, during this 
period of time the number of tweets matching this query per 
hour was higher than 140 0 0. Thus, we assume that group iden- 
tities are salient in these conversations. Among these tweets we 
can ﬁnd messages like: “It’s not just #tottenham. #MetPolice = 
corrupt dishonest + unaccountable ie rotten to the core” and 
“I’m proud of tottenham right now”. 
3. LondonRiots . This set contains tweets that match the query 
#londonriots OR (#london AND riots) and were sent 
on 8 Aug. 2011. At this point, the riots were very prominent in 
London and the number of tweets matching this query per hour 
was > 60,0 0 0 (compared to < 2500 on the previous day). Thus, 
we assume that group identities are salient in these conversa- 
tions. Among these tweets we can ﬁnd messages like: “A riot 
is the language of the unheard - Martin Luther King. #london- 
riots” and “What army do we have to bring in - the majority 
of them are being used as target practice by the Taliban...!!! 
#londonriots”. 
Note the queries used for selecting the different datasets have 
been previously used to identify weak signals of real-world mobil- 
isations in ( Charitonidis et al., 2015 ). 
Table 6 shows the number of conversations, messages, users 
and words contained in the riots sets. 
4.2. Detecting salience of group identities 
4.2.1. Do group identities manifest in online conversations, i.e., is it 
possible to automatically detect the presence of salient group 
identities online? 
Our ﬁrst research question is related to the detection of the 
existence of salient group identities in online conversations. To 
answer this question, we used the conversations extracted dur- 
ing the ﬁrst collection period from the pages of Anonymous, 
Barack Obama, and Manchester United as examples of conversa- 
tions where there are salient group identities. We used the conver- 
sations collected during the ﬁrst collection period from the pages 
Table 7 
Identity salience detection when different feature sets 
are used to train the classiﬁers. 
Feature Set Classiﬁer Accuracy(%) ROC Area 
Structural J48 98 .94 0 .98 
SVM 89 .71 0 .86 
POS J48 96 .98 0 .96 
SVM 98 .61 0 .98 
Semantic J48 97 .31 0 .98 
SVM 97 .96 0 .97 
Category J48 96 .73 0 .97 
SVM 94 .37 0 .9 
Style J48 89 .06 0 .9 
SVM 81 .71 0 .68 
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Fig. 1. ROC curves obtained for the identity salience detection problem with the 
J48 classiﬁer and the structural feature set. 
of BBC World News, NBC News and YouTube, as examples of con- 
versations where there is no apparent salient identity shared by 
the users. We trained the J48 and SVM detection classiﬁers with the 
conversations annotated with each feature set. To assess the ac- 
curacy of these classiﬁers we used leave-one-out cross-validation 
—using a single conversation from the set as the validation data, 
and the remaining conversations as the training data; this was re- 
peated such that each conversation in the dataset was used once 
as the validation data. 
Table 7 shows the results obtained by each classiﬁer when 
the structural features, POS features, semantic features, category 
features and style features are considered. Speciﬁcally, this table 
shows the accuracy, which is the percentage of correctly classiﬁed 
conversations; and the weighted (by class size) area under the ROC 
curve. Accuracy provides an understandable measure for classiﬁer 
performance. However, accuracy must be interpreted with caution 
when classes in the dataset are unbalanced (as occurs in our exper- 
iments). In this situation, the area under the ROC curve is a more 
robust performance measure ( Metz, 1978 ). According to guidelines 
for the interpretation of the area under the ROC curve, excellent 
classiﬁers obtain areas under the ROC curve within the interval 
(0.9, 1], good classiﬁers (0.8, 0.9], fair classiﬁers (0.7, 0.8], poor 
classiﬁers (0.6, 0.7], and fail classiﬁers obtain areas lower or equal 
to 0.6. 
From the results in Table 7 , we can determine that it is possible 
to detect the presence of salient group identities in online conver- 
sations with a high degree of accuracy —an accuracy of 98.94% is 
obtained with the J48 classiﬁer and the structural feature set. Fig. 1 
shows the ROC curves obtained by this classiﬁer. 8 However, all the 
feature sets, with the exception of style features, allow the detec- 
tion of identity salience with a high degree of accuracy, i.e., there 
8 To dismiss overﬁtting problems we also repeated this experiment using cross- 
validation, which is a well-known technique to avoid overﬁtting, with different 
numbers of folders and we obtained very similar results. 
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Table 8 
Identity salience detection: Facebook generalization. 
Feature Set Classiﬁer Accuracy(%) ROC Area 
Structural J48 75 .3 0 .74 
SVM 84 .34 0 .62 
POS J48 69 .28 0 .71 
SVM 66 .27 0 .82 
Semantic J48 83 .13 0 .91 
SVM 92 .17 0 .89 
Category J48 65 .06 0 .58 
SVM 46 .39 0 .61 
Style J48 89 .76 0 .93 
SVM 96 .99 0 .82 
250 Features J48 70 .48 0 .79 
SVM 89 .16 0 .94 
is at least one classiﬁer with an accuracy greater than 96% and the 
area under the ROC curve greater than 0.9. 
We observe that the style feature set is less discriminative, 
e.g., the area under the ROC curve obtained by the best classiﬁer 
trained with the style feature set is the lowest among all classiﬁers. 
This can be explained by the fact that the style features provide a 
characterisation of the style of the different persons but are not 
general enough to detect the common features that characterise 
the existence of salient group identities. 
4.2.2. Are these results generalizable to detection of identity salience 
for unknown group identities and on different online social media? 
Facebook generalization . In this experiment we aim to determine 
whether the previous results are generalizable to detect salience 
of unknown group identities. To this aim, we tested the classiﬁers 
with a different dataset extracted from Facebook. Speciﬁcally, we 
used the conversations collected during the ﬁrst collection period 
from the Facebook pages of Beyoncé and Lady Gaga as examples 
of conversations where there are salient group identities. We used 
the conversations collected during the ﬁrst collection period from 
the Facebook page of MTV as examples of conversations where 
there is no apparent salient group identity. Thus, we are evaluating 
if the classiﬁers are able to detect the salience of group identities 
that belong to different domains (i.e., the training set contains con- 
versations about politics, sports, news, videos, whereas the test set 
contains conversations about music and TV). 
Table 8 shows the results obtained. In general the accuracies of 
all classiﬁers are lower than in the previous experiment. Therefore, 
in order to determine which speciﬁc features are most suitable for 
detecting identity salience, we analysed the information gain ( Kent, 
1983 ) of features. The Information gain (IG) is frequently used in 
machine learning to deﬁne a preferred sequence of features to be 
used by a decision tree (such as the J48 classiﬁer). Usually a fea- 
ture with high IG should be preferred to other features. We cal- 
culated the IG of each feature for detecting identity salience and 
trained our J48 and SVM classiﬁers with the top 250 features by 
IG. This represents less than 40% of all 651 features arising from 
the union of all our feature sets. We used the same training data 
set as in Section 4.2.1 and tested the classiﬁers for detecting iden- 
tity salience or otherwise using conversations from the pages of 
Beyoncé, Lady Gaga and MTV. 
As can be seen in Table 8 , the classiﬁer trained with the most 
relevant features performs very well in this generalization in terms 
of accuracy and the area under the ROC curve. Speciﬁcally, it out- 
performs all classiﬁers trained with one feature set (i.e., an area 
under the ROC curve of 0.94 is obtained with the SVM classiﬁer). 
Fig. 2 shows the ROC curves obtained by this classiﬁer. This indi- 
cates that a combination of the high IG features from the various 
feature sets allows the most generalizable classiﬁer to be trained. 
Therefore, we can conclude that, by using a combination of fea- 
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Fig. 2. ROC curves obtained for the identity salience detection problem when con- 
versations from other Facebook pages are used to test the SVM classiﬁer trained 
with the most relevant feature set. 
Table 9 
Identity salience detection: Twitter generalization. 
Feature Set Classiﬁer Accuracy (%) ROC Area 
Structural J48 94 .73 0 .96 
SVM 73 .89 0 .73 
POS J48 80 .15 0 .82 
SVM 85 .58 0 .85 
Semantic J48 81 .55 0 .83 
SVM 85 .17 0 .85 
Category J48 75 .29 0 .77 
SVM 80 .23 0 .8 
Style J48 77 .51 0 .75 
SVM 72 .41 0 .69 
250 features J48 95 .06 0 .95 
SVM 90 .69 0 .9 
tures, it is possible to automatically detect the salience of unknown 
group identities within the same online media (as used for training 
the classiﬁers) with a high degree of accuracy. 
Twitter Generalization . In this experiment we analyse if our anal- 
ysis model is generalizable to detect identity salience on a different 
online media. We used the conversations contained in the Totten- 
hamRiots set, in the Barack Obama and in the Justin Bieber proﬁles 
as examples of conversations where there are salient group iden- 
tities; and conversations in the TottenhamPreRiots set and the MTV 
proﬁle, as examples of conversations where there is not a salient 
group identity. Again, we employed leave-one-out cross-validation. 
Table 9 shows the results obtained by the detection classiﬁers 
in this experiment. If we compare these results against the results 
of the Facebook detection experiment (described in Section 4.2.1 ), 
we observe that the performance of all classiﬁers deteriorates 
slightly in this experiment. This may be due to the fact that the 
tweet size is limited to 140 characters and fewer words are used 
to analyse conversations and train classiﬁers. As a consequence, the 
J48 classiﬁer trained with the structural feature set (features not 
affected by the number of words in conversations) outperforms the 
rest of classiﬁers. Speciﬁcally, the J48 classiﬁer trained with the 
structural feature set obtains an accuracy of 94.73% and an area 
under the ROC curve of 0.96 — see Fig. 3 for the ROC curves ob- 
tained this classiﬁer. This demonstrates that our analysis model is 
generalizable to detect identity salience on different online media 
with a high accuracy. We can also observe from the table that both 
the J48 and SVM classiﬁers trained with the 250 most relevant fea- 
tures have a high accuracy —90% or above with a high ROC area 
( ≥ 0.9). 
As in the Facebook detection experiment (described in 
Section 4.2.1 ), the style feature set is the less discriminative, i.e., 
the best classiﬁer trained with the style feature is just a fair clas- 
siﬁer since the area under the ROC curve is lower than 0.8. This 
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Fig. 3. ROC curves obtained for the identity salience detection problem with the 
J48 classiﬁer and the structural feature set. 
Table 10 
Ten most relevant features for detecting identity salience. 
Feature Feature description IG 
Type 
Structural Av. Inﬂuence 0 .68 
Structural Messages 0 .48 
Semantic General And Abstract Terms 0 .37 
Semantic Measurement 0 .36 
Semantic Social Actions, States And Processes 0 .35 
Semantic Money generally 0 .34 
POS Base form of lexical verb (e.g., give) 0 .34 
Semantic Degree (i.e., intensiﬁer terms) 0 .34 
Semantic Quantities 0 .33 
Style Av. Typing 0 .32 
supports our hypothesis that style features are not general enough 
to detect the common features of salient group identities. 
4.2.3. Which features are most suitable for detecting identity 
salience? 
Of the 250 most relevant features for detecting identity 
salience, 3 are structural, 110 POS, 104 semantic, 30 categories and 
3 style. However, when we inspect these features in more detail 
we note that the IG of most individual features is not so substan- 
tially high to indicate that those features individually are strong 
indicators of identity salience. But our generalization experiments 
show that collectively they provide a strong basis for predicting 
identity salience. 
Table 10 shows the 10 most relevant features for detecting iden- 
tity salience. Speciﬁcally, for each relevant feature, it presents its 
type, description and IG value. We can observe that the IG values 
are low, which means that, in general, the features are less dis- 
criminative. Six of the ten most relevant features are semantic tags, 
two of them are structural features while one each is from the POS 
and style sets. This information is in line with the results achieved 
by the classiﬁers trained with the different sets of features (i.e., the 
three best classiﬁers in Section 4.2.1 are trained with the struc- 
tural, POS and semantic feature sets). Speciﬁcally, the average IG 
of structural features is noticeably higher than the average IG of 
any other feature set. This explains the fact that the best classiﬁer 
trained with the semantic feature set, which contains 6 of the 10 
most relevant features, does not lead to better performance when 
compared with the best classiﬁer trained with the structural fea- 
ture set. 
We can also observe that the two most relevant features are 
the structural features. This is explained by the fact that structural 
features allow to detect interaction patterns that characterise all 
group identities. For instance, it is possible that users who share a 
group identity are more prone to like comments that invoke this 
Table 11 
Distinguishing group identities using different feature 
sets. 
Feature Set Classiﬁer Accuracy (%) ROC Area 
Structural J48 95 .21 0 .98 
SVM 87 .86 0 .88 
POS J48 95 .85 0 .98 
SVM 98 .4 0 .98 
Semantic J48 98 .72 0 .99 
SVM 99 .68 1 .0 
Category J48 94 .57 0 .99 
SVM 98 .08 0 .99 
Style J48 91 .69 0 .97 
SVM 94 .57 0 .95 
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Fig. 4. ROC curves obtained for the identity identiﬁcation problem with the SVM 
classiﬁer trained with the semantic feature set. 
identity. However, detecting identity salience using structural fea- 
tures only may lead to poor results when detecting incipient group 
identities; such incipient group identities may have little inﬂuence. 
Furthermore, the structural feature of “average inﬂuence” has a 
high IG which reﬂects identity theorists’ view of a cause-effect re- 
lationship, whereby the salience of a social identity inﬂuences col- 
lective action. 
4.3. Distinguishing between group identities 
4.3.1. Is it possible to distinguish between different group identities? 
Having determined that it is possible to detect the salience or 
lack thereof group identities in online conversations, we focus on 
the question of whether it is possible to distinguish between dif- 
ferent group identities. Thus, in this case the class of each conver- 
sation is its group identity (i.e., Facebook page from which each 
conversation has been extracted). To answer our research question 
we used the conversations collected during the ﬁrst collection pe- 
riod from the Facebook pages of Anonymous, Barack Obama, Lady 
Gaga and Manchester United to train identiﬁcation classiﬁers . 
From the results in Table 11 , we can determine that it is possi- 
ble to distinguish between group identities with a high degree of 
accuracy —an accuracy of 99.68% is obtained with the SVM clas- 
siﬁer and the semantic feature set. Fig. 4 shows the ROC curves 
obtained by this classiﬁer 9 . However, all feature sets allow group 
identities to be predicted with a high conﬁdence (i.e., for all fea- 
ture sets there is at least one classiﬁer that obtains an area under 
the ROC curve greater than 0.9). We next analyse if these results 
are generalizable. 
9 Again, to dismiss overﬁtting problems we also repeated this experiment using 
cross-validation and we obtained very similar results. 
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Table 12 
Distinguishing group identities: Time generalization. 
Feature Set Classiﬁer Accuracy (%) ROC Area 
Structural J48 34 .55 0 .54 
SVM 78 .18 0 .62 
POS J48 72 .73 0 .75 
SVM 83 .64 0 .86 
Semantic J48 12 .73 0 .5 
SVM 60 .0 0 .7 
Category J48 45 .45 0 .52 
SVM 49 .09 0 .67 
Style J48 50 .91 0 .57 
SVM 69 .09 0 .6 
250 Features J48 80 .0 0 .74 
SVM 76 .36 0 .82 
4.3.2. Are these results generalizable to distinguishing group 
identities over time and on different online social media? 
Time generalization . We analyse whether the results in 
Section 4.3.1 can be generalized to distinguishing between group 
identities over time. It is obvious that classiﬁers can only classify 
instances into those classes that belong to the training set. This en- 
tails that we cannot use the classiﬁers to predict other group iden- 
tities not included in the training set. Because of this, we can only 
determine if the results obtained in the above analysis, can be gen- 
eralized to conversations invoking the same group identities over 
a different period of time. Note that the groups may evolve over 
time; e.g., the issues that are of interest to a group may change 
throughout time, but the collective sense of belonging to a speciﬁc 
group (i.e., the group identity) remains. 
We test the accuracy of our previously trained classiﬁers, 
trained with the conversations collected during the ﬁrst collec- 
tion period from the Facebook pages of Anonymous, Barack Obama, 
Lady Gaga and Manchester United to distinguish between group 
identities in the conversations collected during the second collec- 
tion period from the same pages. Thus, we are evaluating if the 
classiﬁers are able to predict the same group identities (i.e., being 
a supporter or opponent of Anonymous, Barack Obama, Lady Gaga 
or Manchester United) when they are invoked more than one year 
later. Similar to identity salience detection, we also determine the 
IG of all the features in the union of our feature sets and use the 
top 250 features to train J48 and SVM identiﬁcation classiﬁers. 
As we can observe from Table 12 , the accuracy and the area 
under the ROC curve for all classiﬁers based on individual fea- 
ture sets decrease. This is explained by the fact that these groups 
have evolved in terms of content (e.g., the main topics discussed 
in conversations), style (e.g., the number of words per message) 
and structure (e.g., number of users per conversation). For ex- 
ample, the inﬂuence and importance of Barack Obama’s Facebook 
page increased noticeably between the two collection periods (see 
Table 1 ). As a result, it is possible that the number of users in- 
teracting in the page, the number of likes received per each mes- 
sage and the activity of these users changed drastically. These dif- 
ferences make it more challenging to predict group identities over 
time. 
Despite these changes, we can observe that group identities can 
be identiﬁed with a high accuracy by the classiﬁer trained with 
the POS feature set —an accuracy of 83.64% and an area under 
the ROC curve of 0.86 is obtained with the SVM classiﬁer and 
the POS feature set. This entails that despite the passing of time, 
there are syntactic characteristics of each group identity that re- 
main unaltered. We also observe that the classiﬁers trained with 
the 250 most relevant features perform better than those classi- 
ﬁers trained with individual feature sets (except the POS feature 
set). This shows that it is possible to use a combination of fea- 
tures to automatically predict and distinguish group identities over 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Barak Obama Anonymous
Lady Gaga Manchester United
Fig. 5. ROC curves obtained for the identity prediction problem when conversations 
from a different time period are used to test the SVM classiﬁer trained with the 
most relevant feature set. 
Table 13 
Distinguishing group identities: Twitter generalization. 
Feature Set Classiﬁer Accuracy (%) ROC Area 
Structural J48 80 .69 0 .87 
SVM 71 .37 0 .74 
POS J48 75 .74 0 .79 
SVM 77 .64 0 .77 
Semantic J48 77 .39 0 .77 
SVM 82 .84 0 .86 
Category J48 72 .85 0 .72 
SVM 75 .33 0 .73 
Style J48 72 .44 0 .39 
SVM 70 .71 0 .65 
250 features J48 82 .92 0 .82 
SVM 87 .62 0 .89 
time with a high degree of accuracy —an accuracy of 82.92% is ob- 
tained with the SVM classiﬁer and the most relevant feature set 
with substantial conﬁdence in the prediction (i.e., the ROC area is 
0.82). Fig. 5 shows the ROC curves obtained by the SVM classiﬁer 
and the 250 most relevant features. 
Twitter generalization . We evaluate the extent to which our anal- 
ysis can be generalized to identify group identities on different on- 
line media. To this end, we trained identiﬁcation classiﬁers with the 
conversations contained in the TottenhamRiots and LondonRiots sets 
and the Twitter proﬁles of Barack Obama, Lady Gaga, Manchester 
United and Anonymous. Again, we employed leave-one-out cross- 
validation to assess each classiﬁer and feature set. 
Table 13 shows the results obtained. If we compare these re- 
sults against the results of the Facebook identiﬁcation experiment 
(described in Section 4.3.1 ), we observe that the performance of all 
classiﬁers deteriorates slightly in this experiment. Again, this may 
be explained by the tweet size limitation. Besides that, we have 
used conversations invoking similar group identities (i.e., group 
identities that correspond to different protest groups), which may 
be more diﬃcult to distinguish from one another. Despite these 
similarities, group identities can be identiﬁed with high precision 
(i.e., there are classiﬁers that obtain areas under the ROC curve 
greater than 0.8). We observe that the classiﬁers trained with 
the 250 most relevant features perform better overall than those 
trained with individual feature sets. This shows that that our anal- 
ysis model is generalizable to identify group identities on differ- 
ent online media with a high degree of accuracy – an accuracy of 
87.62% is obtained with the SVM classiﬁer and the most relevant 
feature set with substantial conﬁdence in the predictions (i.e., the 
ROC area is 0.89). Fig. 6 shows the ROC curves obtained by the 
SVM classiﬁer and the 250 most relevant features. 
The classiﬁers trained with the style features obtain the lowest 
accuracies and ROC areas. This result conﬁrms that style features 
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Fig. 6. ROC curves obtained for the identity prediction problem with the SVM clas- 
siﬁer trained with the 250 most relevant features. 
Table 14 
Ten most relevant features for distinguishing group identities. 
Feature Feature description IG 
Type 
POS Singular letter of the alphabet (e.g., a) 0 .96 
POS Formula 0 .92 
Style Av. Message Length (Chars) 0 .92 
Semantic Power relationship 0 .91 
Semantic General And Abstract Terms 0 .9 
Category Sports 0 .89 
Style Av. Message Length (Words) 0 .88 
Semantic Measurement 0 .87 
Category Crime 0 .87 
Semantic Social Actions, States And Processes 0 .86 
provide a characterisation of the individual styles and are not gen- 
eral enough to distinguish the common features that characterise 
each group identity. 
4.3.3. Which features enable a speciﬁc group identity to be 
accurately predicted? 
Of the 250 features used to train the classiﬁers in Tables 12 and 
13 , 101 are semantic features, 106 POS, 35 categories, 5 style and 3 
are structural features. This may lead one to conclude that seman- 
tic and POS features are the most necessary to characterise a group 
identity. However, when we study the IG of the top 10 features for 
predicting group identities (see Table 14 ), we observe that this is 
not necessarily the case. As illustrated by this table, 4 of the 10 
most relevant features are semantic tags, 2 are style metrics, 2 are 
categories and 2 are POS tags; and all have very high IGs. 
Interestingly, two style features show high IG, yet the best clas- 
siﬁer trained with the style feature set is less accurate when com- 
pared with the best classiﬁers trained with the other feature sets. 
This is explained by the fact that the two high IG style features 
provide the same information (i.e., the more words in a message, 
the more characters it has) and their “addition” does not provide 
more information. 
5. Discussion 
Our results validate our hypothesis that group identities affect 
the way in which people communicate online and that it is possi- 
ble to deﬁne a model that automatically analyses group identities 
using features extracted from text-based online communications. 
We now discuss some of the key insights and their potential im- 
plications. 
Group identity manifests in semantic features . When distinguish- 
ing between group identities in Facebook (cf. Table 14 ), it is 
not surprising to note the presence of categories such as Crime 
and Sports —these are evocative topics and have been shown to 
have a causal connection with social identity formation ( Levine & 
Crowther, 2008 ). The more interesting data is the presence of se- 
mantic features: General and Abstract Terms , which pertain to lan- 
guage use with regards to action/inaction in general, and Social 
Actions, States and Processes , which cover language use involving 
reciprocity, participation, friendliness and approachability. Interest- 
ingly these features also appear in the ten most relevant features 
for identity salience detection in Table 10 (albeit with a signiﬁ- 
cantly lower IG). This reﬂects that formative processes for social 
identity manifest themselves in the semantics of the group con- 
versations and can act as potential indicators for the emergence of 
social identities in online groups. 
We also note the presence of the Power Relationship se- 
mantic feature in Table 14 . This feature covers terms depicting 
power/authority/inﬂuence and organisation/administration. Also 
noteworthy are: the structural indicator of average inﬂuence and 
semantic indicator of intensiﬁer terms (depicted by the Degree se- 
mantic tag) for identity salience in Table 10 . Together, these point 
to a potential link between such features and social identity and 
group mobilisation. All these features merit further investigation. 
Impact of the type and nature of social media . Our attempts at 
generalizing our analysis show reasonably high degrees of accu- 
racy. However, they also indicate that the very nature of the social 
network and that of the data it carries has an effect. In particular, 
our generalization experiments show that there is not a single fea- 
ture set that is able to produce satisfactory results in Facebook and 
Twitter. This may be attributed to the limits on message size in 
Twitter or how identity is implicitly expressed on different social 
media owing to the different features they afford to users ( Conover 
et al., 2011; Zhao et al., 2008 ) and how these features may lead 
to various “in-group” and “out-group” formulations. However, the 
250 most relevant features have been able to predict group iden- 
tities with high accuracies across different social media. It would 
be interesting to study how other types of social media impact the 
accuracy of such a predictive approach and whether a hybrid fea- 
ture set drawing upon training data from a range of online social 
media can provide a basis for accurately detecting incipient group 
identities. 
The ethics of it all . The possibility of automatically predicting 
group identities poses a broad range of challenging ethical ques- 
tions. For example, the features analysed in our study may be used 
for monitoring the evolution of group identities over time. This 
may permit the identiﬁcation of different steps involved in the 
consolidation of social identities online. In turn, it may be possi- 
ble to identify actions (e.g., shifts in behaviour) that reliably im- 
pact on a group’s subsequent behaviour. By “seeding” speciﬁc se- 
mantic or structural features in text-based communications it may 
be possible to make speciﬁc identities salient and hence “nudge”
the group’s behaviour towards a speciﬁc outcome. On the one 
hand, democratic movements such as the Arab Spring could be 
promoted; e.g., by creating messages with an strong emphasis on 
reciprocity, participation, friendliness and approachability. 10 On the 
other hand, however, so could be violent actions such as the Eng- 
land Riots. These questions are highly pertinent given recent high 
proﬁle news of mass surveillance activities such as Prism and the 
Snowden leaks. 
We have implemented the Identi-scope tool that can enable ex- 
ploration of these challenges. Furthermore, groups can utilise the 
tool to study if their conversations are being systematically nudged 
towards particular action or inaction through manipulation of the 
features we have identiﬁed. 
10 According to our experiments, these topics are key features underpinning group 
identities. 
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Limitations of our analysis . Our evaluation and results are based 
on data collected from Facebook and Twitter. As we note above, 
the nature of the social network and the purpose for which it is 
used by the various parties involved can inﬂuence the way social 
identities manifest themselves. Data from other social networks, 
especially those that cater for speciﬁc demographics, e.g., young 
people, or particular group aﬃliations (political, religious, etc.) may 
yield different results. One may conjecture that social networks 
that are aimed at particular group aﬃliations are likely to yield 
more accurate prediction of group identities. At the same time, 
there may be more ﬁne-grained social identities at play (com- 
pared to the coarse-grained group identities in our study) in these 
social networks. Further experimentation is needed to determine 
whether the automated analysis presented in this paper will yield 
high accuracies for such ﬁne-grained social identities. 
Our model predicts those group identities that are sustained by 
online interactions. Notwithstanding the role of oﬄine interactions 
in social identity formation and processes, our model only consid- 
ers the information that is publicly available in online social media 
to predict group identities. The creation of a hybrid model capable 
of considering both online and oﬄine interactions when predicting 
social identities is left as future work. 
Model feasibility . The proposed analytical model and the Identi- 
scope tool make extensive usage of different APIs provided by third 
parties. In particular, both the Facebook Graph API 11 and the Twit- 
ter public API 12 are used to collect the conversations to be used 
by the analytical model. Note these two APIs impose rate call lim- 
its to non-paying users. Similarly, our model and tool also make 
use of the Relative Insight’s Interaction Analysis Engine 13 for NLP 
tasks, which is also accessed via its API over the Internet. Thus, 
the time need to analyse messages may be affected by network 
latency, congestion etc. However, these APIs process a reasonable 
amount of requests in a short period of time (e.g., the Facebook 
API allows us to collect information about 10 0 0 messages in less 
than 6 seconds). Finally, we would like to mention that, for those 
domains where the volume and speed at which data is produced 
makes it necessary to reduce the time needed for processing, solu- 
tions such as parallelisation of the analysis, usage of paid APIs, etc. 
can be applied. 
Model vulnerabilities . Our experiments demonstrate that our 
model is robust to predict group identities even if there are mes- 
sages that invoke outlier identities (i.e., we have not performed 
any preprocessing on conversations to ﬁlter out outlier messages). 
However, this robustness may not hold when evasion techniques 
are used to mask group identities. For example, Islamic State sup- 
porters could try to misdirect group identity detection by injecting 
into their conversations messages in which a fake identity is in- 
voked. Even more, automated approaches could be envisioned so 
that a single entity (whether individual or organisation) controls a 
large number of fake accounts to launch such evasive attacks. How- 
ever, these threats can be mitigated using existing sybil defences 
( Alvisi, Clement, Epasto, Lattanzi, & Panconesi, 2013; Fong, 2011 ), 
classiﬁcation techniques ( Thomas, McCoy, Grier, Kolcz, & Paxson, 
2013 ), and stylometry techniques ( Afroz, Islam, Stolerman, Green- 
stadt, & McCoy, 2014; Brennan, Afroz, & Greenstadt, 2012; Ding, 
Fung, & Debbabi, 2015 ) to discard fake accounts and messages. The 
speciﬁc mitigation techniques to be applied in a given situation 
may depend not only on the evasion techniques used by attackers 
but also on the nature of the social media 14 . 
11 https://developers.facebook.com/docs/graph-api 
12 https://dev.twitter.com/rest/public 
13 https://relativeinsight.com/ 
14 An study to generate speciﬁc mitigation strategies is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
6. Conclusion 
The model and results presented in this paper provide a step- 
ping stone towards understanding how group identities and their 
salience manifest in text-based communications via online social 
media and the implications this holds regarding risk posed by ex- 
ternal agents (government or otherwise) to inﬂuence collective ac- 
tion/inaction mediated by online social media. Our results show 
that it is possible to use linguistic and structural features and 
machine learning techniques to automatically distinguish between 
speciﬁc group identities as well as detect when group identities 
may be salient. Such predictions are not just highly accurate within 
a particular social networking platform but also show potential for 
generalization on different types of social networks. Particularly in- 
sightful are our observations about speciﬁc semantic features of 
the language used in conversations that indicate social processes 
for group formulation at work. Our analysis also shows a potential 
link between group identities and mobilisation inherent in the lan- 
guage of online groups. We also highlight the challenging ethical 
questions raised by the ability to detect and, potentially affect, so- 
cial identities and their salience through analysis and manipulation 
of language features. We have developed a tool that allows explo- 
ration of social identities by individuals and groups so that they 
may develop resilience against outside agents attempting to inﬂu- 
ence their actions through manipulation of the features we have 
identiﬁed. 
Our future work will focus on exploring speciﬁc research ques- 
tions around the manifestation of particular types of semantic fea- 
tures and the impact of the nature of the social network as well as 
communication modes and processes on group identity analysis. 
Only by gaining a deeper understanding of the features and com- 
munication processes at play can we hope to unravel the various 
ethics and privacy questions raised by this paper. 
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